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The Italian saving rate has exhibited large variability since World War 11, with 
a trend decline in the past two decades, following very high levels in the fifties 
and sixties. Since tax incentives and social security arrangements are poten- 
tially important determinants of  private and national saving, it is natural to 
consider whether changes in the tax code and in the social security system have 
contributed to the changes in the Italian saving rate. For instance, is the decline 
due to reforms in the taxation of capital income or to the transition from funded 
social security to a pay-as-you-go system? Alternatively, would the private sav- 
ing rate have declined even further were it not for the tax incentives introduced 
in the eighties? 
The empirical literature on the Italian saving rate is of very limited help in 
answering these questions. This paper describes the tax  and social security 
developments that are relevant to household saving choices, to provide a frame- 
work for future research on the effects of  government incentives to save in 
Italy.' 
Tullio Jappelli is associate professor of economics at the Istituto Universitario Navale, Napoli. 
Marco Pagano is associate professor of economics at Universitii Bocconi, Milano. Both are re- 
search fellows of the Center for Economic Policy Research. 
The authors thank Antonio Cristoforo for helpful comments. 
I. After the completion of this paper in August 1992, a number of reforms have reshaped several 
aspects of the Italian tax and social security systems. A real estate tax (Imposra Comunale sugli 
Immobili  [ICI]) has been introduced for the  first time and its proceeds devolved to local govern- 
ment. The tax on capital gains has been suspended. The social security system has become less 
generous. Over the next decade the minimum retirement age will be gradually raised from 60 to 
65 years for men and from 55 to 60 for women; the minimum period of contribution will increase 
from fifteen to twenty years; the period of the working life on the basis of which pension benefits 
are computed (so far the last five years) will be gradually extended to the last ten years for the 
current employees and to the entire working life for employees hired after 1992; the degree of 
pension indexation has been reduced and contributions raised. Finally, private pension funds have 
been regulated, and employers'  contributions to pension funds will gradually replace severance 
Pay. 
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In section 5.1 we document the shifts in household portfolios in the past two 
decades. This is followed by a brief history and description of the present rules 
governing the tax treatment of capital income, the taxation of wealth, capital 
transfers, and capital gains, the integration of dividend taxation with the corpo- 
rate income tax, and the tax treatment of  interest on household debt (section 
5.2). In section 5.3 we focus on the institutional arrangements that affect incen- 
tives to save for retirement, i.e., social security (section 5.3.1), private pension 
funds (section 5.3.2), and severance pay (section 5.3.3). In section 5.4 we de- 
scribe the public incentives to hold life insurance policies that have been re- 
cently introduced into the Italian tax code and compute the excess return of a 
typical life insurance policy relative to the rate of interest on public debt. 
5.1  The Household Balance Sheet 
Throughout the postwar period the Italian national saving rate has been con- 
sistently above the OECD average. Italy’s net national saving rate was 3.4 per- 
centage points above the Group of Seven average in the sixties, 2 points in the 
seventies, and 1 point in the eighties (Dean et al. 1990). In all three periods, 
Italy ranked second only to Japan. 
Another distinction of the Italian saving rate has been its variability, which 
has far exceeded that of most other industrialized countries. The net national 
saving rate rose from 7 percent in 1952 to 22 percent in  1961. The sixties 
registered high and relatively stable saving rates, ranging between 18 and 22 
percent. The past two decades then witnessed a trend decline in saving, down 
to 9 percent of  net national income in  1990 (see Guiso, Jappelli, and Ter- 
lizzese 1994). 
In  the  past  two  decades,  the  composition  of  household  net  worth  has 
changed considerably, as well. Table 5.1 shows that the share of housing and 
of nonresidential real estate declined by 12.2 percent over the 1975-89 period; 
conversely, the stock of durable goods and of  net financial assets rose by 3.9 
and 8.3 percent, respectively. 
Table 5.2 indicates that, within the class of financial assets, households ac- 
complished a massive portfolio shift from debt claims on banks and private 
companies to public sector debt. The sum of  currency and deposits shrank 
from 62.1 percent of total household assets in 1975 to less than 40 percent in 
1989. Private bonds declined even more steeply, from 8.2 to 3.1 percent. The 
mirror  image of  this  decline in  bank  deposits and  private  bonds was  the 
10-fold increase of the share of government debt in household portfolios, from 
3.2 percent in  1975 to 32.1 percent in 1989. Capital controls, in place until 
1989, prevented Italian households from diversifying their portfolios away 
from public debt: this is witnessed by the minuscule share of foreign assets, 
which never exceeded 1.5 percent of total financial assets. 
Other significant features of table 5.2 are Italian households’ relatively small 
holdings of  equities  and  their  low  borrowing, compared  with  most  other 107  Government Incentives and Household Saving in Italy 
Table 5.1  Composition of Household Net Worth, 1975-89 











D  u  r  a  b  1  e s 
Net financial assets 
Net worth 
Wealth-income ratio 
Level (thousand billion current lire) 
322.1  913.9 
29.0  74.5 
43.1  143.6 
88.3  230.4 
482.4  1,362.4 
112.1  297.0 
As a % of Net Worth 
66.8  67.1 
6.0  5.5 
8.9  10.5 
18.3  16.9 
100.0  100.0 

























Source: Pagliano and Rossi (1992, tables 20 and 21). 
OECD countries. The small share of equities reflects the thinness of the Italian 
stock market, even after the introduction of investment funds in 1984 and the 
stock market boom of  1985-86;  the low level of household debt is due mainly 
to regulation, high enforcement costs, and the lack of substantial incentives to 
borrow (Jappelli and Pagano 1989, 1994). The high nominal interest rates of 
the seventies and early eighties placed an additional burden on debtors (due to 
the lack of indexed mortgage instruments) so that the share of household liabil- 
ities declined until the mid-eighties, not regaining the 1975 level until 1989. 
Table 5.2 shows that most financial assets held by  Italian households have 
short maturities (the average maturity of public debt was 3.5 years at the end 
of  1987). The only long-term saving instruments are those  explicitly ear- 
marked for retirement needs, i.e., life insurance, pension funds, and severance 
pay. Insurance policies and severance pay accounted for almost 20 percent of 
total financial assets in 1975, but declined to 11.3 percent in 1985 and to about 
10 percent in 1989. But the data displayed in table 5.2 are a misleading indica- 
tor of the assets held to finance retirement consumption, because (i) the value 
of pension funds is omitted, (ii) the official figures for severance pay do not 
take into account that severance pay is partially indexed to the consumer price 
index, and (iii) the figure for insurance measures assets held by insurance com- 
panies against all insurance policies, not just life insurance, which is the only 
policy that can provide retirement income. 
The estimates in table 5.3 overcome these measurement problems. The ad- 
justed figures show that in Italy pension funds and life insurance policies form 
a tiny fraction of financial assets, in sharp contrast with most other industrial- 108  Tullio Jappelli and Marco Pagano 
Table 5.2  Composition of Household Financial Assets, 1975-89  (%) 
1975  1980  1985  I989 
Assets 
Currency and deposits  62.1  60.2  45.8  39.3 
Currency  6.8  5.4  3.8  3.3 
Bank deposits  44.5  45.2  34.1  26.7 
Postal deposits  8.2  8.0  5.6  6.4 
Deposits at SCI”  2.6  1.6  2.3  2.9 
Government bonds  3.2  13.2  26.8  32.  I 
BOT”  0.1  8.6  12.7  14.5 
CCTh  -  2.3  12.0  10.7 
Other government bonds”  3.1  2.3  2.1  6.9 
Private bonds‘  8.2  2.7  2.7  3.1 
-  2.2  3.1  Investment fundsd  - 
Equities  5.3  7.0  9.5  9.9 
Foreign assets  1.4  1  .o  1  .O  1.5 
::;  ]  10.9‘ 
Insurance  6.6  5.7 
Severance pay  13.2  9.8 
Other assets  0.1  0.5  0.2 
Total financial assets  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Liabilities 
Bank loans  39.9  56.4  58.4  53.9 
SCI loans  56.5  37.8  34.7  31.9 
Other liabilities‘  3.7  5.9  6.8  14.2 
Total liabilities  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Liabilities/assets (%)  8.3  7.0  5.8  1.4 
Sources: For 1975-85,  Bank of Italy, “The Wealth of Italian Households, Economic Bulletin (En- 
glish edition), no. 3 (1986); for 1989, Bank of Italy, Annual Report, Statistical Appendix (Roma, 
1990), table aD29. 
%Special credit institutions (SCI). 
bBOT are treasury bills up to one-year maturity. CCT are floating-rate treasury credit certificates, 
2 to 4 years in maturity indexed to BOTs; these certificates were introduced in 1977. Other govern- 
ment bonds include BTP (long-term government bonds), bonds issued by  the PO Deposits and 
Loans Fund, bonds issued by  local governments and by public sector enterprises. 
LBonds  issued by private enterprises and by special credit institutions. 
dInvestment  funds were authorized in 1984. 
‘For  1989 separate figures for insurance, severance pay, and other assets are not available. 
?n  1989 this item also includes consumer credit extended by finance companies (see D’Alessio 
1990). 
ized countries. Only accrued severance pay entitlement accounts for more than 
a negligible share of household financial wealth, between 8 and 9 percent. The 
fact that private pension arrangements and life insurance wealth have such little 
attraction for Italian savers cannot be explained by lack of  tax incentives: the 
tax treatment of both types of assets, and in particular of private pension funds, 
is quite favorable, as is documented in sections 5.3 and 5.4. 
Table 5.4 completes the picture by providing information on the distribution 109  Government Incentives and Household Saving in Italy 
Table 5.3  Pension Funds, Life Insurance, and Severance Pay 
Pension Funds  Life Insurance  Severance Pay  Financial Assets 





















Trillion Lire (end-of-period  estimates) 
-  40.6 
-  47.9 
-  55.9 
-  63.8 
9.6  73.2 
11.9  83.5 
15.0  95.3 
19.5  105.2 
24.7  115.1 
As a % of Household Financial Assets 
1.3  8.8 
1.7  7.8 
100.0 
100.0 
Notes: Col. (1)-no  official statistics exist for pension funds. Sources are for 1983, Commissione 
tecnica per la spesa pubblica; for 1985, Banca d’Italia-IMI-INA (1986) estimate pension funds to 
be between 15 and 30 trillion lire; for 1988,  Piatti (1990) estimates it to range from 35 to 45 trillion 
lire. In the table we report the midrange value for these two years. 
Col. (2)-assets  held by domestic and foreign insurance companies as a counterpart to life insur- 
ance policies sold to residents. Source is Annuario ANZA  (Roma, 1990), table 13. 
Col. (3)-the  official estimates of severance pay do not take into account the indexation of sever- 
ance pay. The figures in this table adjust for indexation and are drawn from Piatti (1990, table 5). 
Col. (4)-these  figures are obtained by replacing the official estimate of the value of severance 
pay with its adjusted estimate, and by adding the value of pension funds. 
of  wealth. We  report data, by  decile, on net worth, net real assets, financial 
assets, and bank deposits drawn from the 1989 Survey of Household Income 
and Wealth. The median net worth is about 103 million lire, while the median 
holding of financial assets and deposits are 10 and 9 million lire, respectively. 
The  latter  two  values-approximately  $8,000 in  1989-are  considerably 
higher than in the United States, where Deaton (1992) reports that the median 
level of household liquid assets in the early eighties was less than $1,000. The 
difference between these numbers may reflect differences in the composition 
of household assets as well as in households’ propensity to save. 
In the next sections, we shall first provide an overall view of the tax treat- 
ment of capital income in Italy and then describe the specific provisions affect- 
ing retirement saving, i.e., the rules of  the social security system and the tax 
provisions concerning private pension plans, severance pay, and life insurance. 
5.2  Taxation of Capital Income 
In Italy interest income is taxed at a flat rate or is tax-exempt, depending on 
the type of asset, and capital gains were effectively tax-exempt until 1990. The 110  Tullio Jappelli and Marco Pagano 
Table 5.4  Distribution of Household Wealth and Financial Assets in 1989 
Financial 
Net Worth  Real Assets  Assets  Deposits 











































































































Source: The numbers are based on the sample of 8,274  households of the 1989 Survey of House- 
hold Income and Wealth. We  thank Luigi Cannari for providing us with the data. The median 
income in the survey is 29,057 thousand lire. 
Note: V = value of the assets held by the poorest household in the decile. S = share of  the assets 
held by the households belonging to the decile (sum to 100 except for rounding errors). 
rate at which interest income is taxed is well below the average marginal tax 
rate on income from labor, and Italy features a much lower overall tax rate on 
income from capital than the United Kingdom, the United States, West Ger- 
many, and Sweden (Giannini 1989). 
The foundations of the current tax system were laid by the 1974 tax reform 
act, which introduced two separate taxes on personal income: a progressive 
income tax levied at the national level (Zmposta sul Reddito  delle Persone 
Fisiche [IRPEF]), whose base is formed by  income from labor and income 
from capital excluding interest income (i.e., dividends, profits, and rents); and 
a proportional tax on all kinds of income from capital except interest income, 
presently levied at a flat rate of  16.2 percent (Imposta Locale  sui  Redditi 
[ILOR]), whose revenue is collected by the central government and originally 
devolved on local governments, as well as a proportional tax on corporate in- 
come (Zmposta sul Reddito delle Persone Giuridiche [IRPEG]  ) presently lev- 
ied at a flat rate of 36 percent. 
In table 5.5 we report the composition of tax revenues of the general govern- 
ment by main categories. In 1991 more than 50 percent of total revenues were 
raised in the form of direct taxes. The IRPEF alone represented one-third of 
total revenues, while IRPEG and ILOR accounted for roughly 5 percent of 
revenue. As shown in table 5.5, while taxes on capital income represent a sub- 111  Government Incentives and Household Saving in Italy 
Table 5.5  Sources of Government Revenue"  (as  a % of total revenues) 
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Total  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source: Bank of Italy, Annual Report, Statistical Appendix (Roma, various years), table aC6 
"The figures exclude revenues of  local governments and other government agencies. They also 
exclude direct taxes collected in Sicily. 
bTax-exempt  before 1986. 
stantial source of  revenue, the withholding tax on dividends and the tax on 
estates, inheritances, and gifts have always represented a minuscule share of 
revenue. The composition of interest taxes has changed considerably, the main 
reason being that taxation of  interest on government bonds was introduced 
in 1986. 
Table 5.6 displays the current tax brackets and those in place before the tax 
reform of 1989. It shows that the degree of progressivity of IRPEF has dimin- 
ished and the number of  tax brackets reduced in the past two decades by  a 
series of reforms (in 1983, 1986, and 1989). In fact, the number of  brackets 
dropped from 32 in  1976 to 7 in  1989, while the top marginal tax rate was 
lowered from 72 to 50 percent. 
An important innovation of the 1989 reform was indexing tax brackets for 
inflation. This partially eliminated the fiscal drag built into the previous rate 
schedules, which had caused a substantial increase in the tax burden during 
the seventies and eighties: the ratio of IRPEF receipts to GDP had risen from 
3.8 percent in 1975 to 7.6 percent in 1985, and its ratio to total tax revenues 
rose from 17 to 35 percent. 
Dividends, income from unincorporated business, rents, imputed income 
from home ownership, severance pay, income paid by life insurance policies, 
and pensions are subject to IRPEF and, with the exception of  pensions, to 
ILOR. All other income from capital (mainly interest payments) is excluded 
from the tax base of IRPEF: a flat-rate withholding tax is in fact levied on all 
nominal interest income. 
The extent to which recipients of capital income succeed in evading taxes is 112  Tullio Jappelli and Marco Pagano 
Table 5.6  Marginal Tax Rates on Labor Income (a) 
1976-82 
Bracketb  Rate 
53  10 
3-4  13 
4-5  16 
5-6  19 
6-7.5  22 
7.5-9  25 
9-1  1  27 
11-13  29 
13-15  31 
15-17  32 
17-19  33 
19-22  34 
22-25  35 
30-35  38 
35-40  40 
40-50  42 
50-60  44 
80-100  48 
100-125  50 
125-150  52 
150-175  54 
175-200  56 
200-250  58 
250-300  60 
350-400  64 
400-450  66 
450-500  68 
500-550  70 
>550  72 
25-30  36 
60-80  46 
300-350  62 
1983-85  1986-88  1989-90’  1991’ 
Bracketb  Rate  Bracketb  Rate  Bracketb  Rate  Bracketb  Rate 
511  18 
11-24  27 
24-30  35 
30-38  37 
38-60  41 
60-120  47 
120-250  56 
250-500  62 










12  56.4  10  56.8  10 
22  6.4-12.7  22  6.8-13.5  22 
27  12.7-31.8  26  13.5-33.7  26 
41  63.7-159.1  40  67.6-168.8  40 
53  >318.3  50  >337.7  50 
58 
62 
34  31.8-63.7  33  33.7-67.6  33 
48  159.1-318.3  45  168.8-337.7  45 
~  ~~ 
“In March 1989  tax brackets were indexed to the cost of living starting in 1990. 
bBrackets are determined by annual income in mllions of lire. 
hard to gauge. Although there is a common perception that Italy has a signifi- 
cant hidden or underground economy, no estimates exist for the share of capital 
income that escapes taxation because it is not reported to the tax authorities.* 
2. Various methods for estimating the size of the hidden economy have been proposed (Marrelli 
1989). Visco (1983) evaluates the difference between earned income reported on tax returns and 
wage income from the national accounts at about 10 percent for employees and 35-40  percent for 
the self-employed. Estimates based on the difference between the labor force participation rate in 
Italy and in other Western countries range from 10 to 25 percent (Marrelli 1989). 113  Government Incentives and Household Saving in Italy 
5.2.1  The Taxation of Dividends and Corporate Taxation 
Until 1974 individuals could choose between two regimes of dividend taxa- 
tion: (i) let dividends be part of the income tax base and then be taxed at the 
personal income tax rate (which ranged from 10 to 82 percent), or (ii) pay a 
flat 30 percent tax rate-cedolure  seccu (final schedule withholding tax). In 
either case, there was no tax credit for corporate taxes. The 1974 reform elimi- 
nated the second regime: since then dividends must be included in the income 
tax base. At the same time, the previous system of corporate taxation was re- 
placed by the two proportional income taxes mentioned above: a company tax 
levied at the national level (IRPEG) and the so-called local tax (ILOR). The 
tax rate for ILOR was the same as for individuals. 
The tax bases for the two taxes were virtually the same, and initially ILOR 
was not deductible from the tax base of IRPEG. The IRPEG tax rate was 25 
percent, while for ILOR, initially, each local authority was given the right to 
set its own tax rate, ranging between 9.4 and 14.7 percent. However, after 1977 
ILOR was levied at a uniform tax rate of  15 percent and the proceeds trans- 
ferred to the central government. The resulting corporate income tax was 40 
percent. 
In  1978 two major changes occurred. First, an imputation system was intro- 
duced  for dividends and phased in  over a two-year period. Full credit for 
IRPEG was allowed against the liability deriving from the personal income tax 
(IRPEF), although no credit was allowed for ILOR. Second, ILOR became 
deductible from IRPEG at the corporate income tax level. As a result, the cor- 
porate income tax rate fell to 36.25 percent. 
From 1983 to 1992, IRPEG and ILOR were raised to 36 and 16.2 percent, 
respectively, so that the overall corporate tax rate rose to 46.36 percent. The 
IRPEG (but not the ILOR) has remained fully deductible from the personal 
income tax on dividends since 1983. 
The average marginal tax rate on dividend recipients was estimated to be 
43.6 percent  in  1980 and  49.1  percent  in  1985 (Alworth and  Castellucci 
1993).3  Both estimates are based on tax return information on the distribution 
of dividend income and are obtained by multiplying the value of reported divi- 
dend income by the marginal tax rate which applies to each tax bracket. The 
corresponding value for 1990 was estimated to be 46.1 percent, assuming that 
the distribution of share ownership remained the same as in 1981, but allowing 
for the drift in tax brackets associated with inflation. 
5.2.2  Interest Income 
The tax rates on nominal interest income differ according to the type of 
investor, the type of financial instrument, and its issuer, and they have varied 
3. A similar figure is reported by Giannini (1989),  who estimates the 1980 average marginal tax 
rate on dividends to be 43.5 percent. 114  Tullio Jappelli and Marco Pagano 














-*-  Government bonds 
1970  1974  1978  1982  1986  1990 
Fig. 5.1  Tax rates on interest income, by main asset categories: 1970-92 
considerably over time. Figure 5.1 displays tax rates on interest income for 
four main asset categories; the appendix traces the past and current values of 
all tax rates on interest from financial assets. At present, all deposits and postal 
saving accounts are taxed at 30 percent, while public and private debt instru- 
ments are taxed at 12.5 percent (except for CDs with less than 18 months of 
maturity, which are taxed at 25 percent). Foreign assets have always been taxed 
at higher rates than domestic securities, reflecting restrictions on capital mobil- 
ity. These restrictions have been partly removed in recent years, and the tax 
rate on foreign assets has accordingly declined to the current 30 percent level, 
down from 50 percent in 1984. 
For comparison with the discussion in the previous paragraph, note that the 
marginal tax rate on interest income was estimated to be 19.7 percent in 1980, 
22.5 percent in 1985, and 16.7 in 1990 (Alworth and Castellucci 1993), about 
half of that on  dividend^.^ 
4. These values were computed by weighting the tax rate that applies to each debt instrument 
by the respective ownership shares and allowing for indirect lending through the banking system 
via purchase of  securities issued by companies and special credit institutions. 115  Government Incentives and Household Saving in Italy 
5.2.3  Taxation of Wealth and Capital Transfers 
In Italy there are no taxes on personal financial wealth. The only wealth tax, 
other than on estates, inheritances, and gifts, which will be discussed below, is 
a capital gains tax on nominal price increases of real estate. The tax, introduced 
in  1974 and considerably revised in 1980, is paid only when property is trans- 
ferred-whether  through a sale, a bequest, or a gift-and  is called INVIM 
(Impostu sull 'Increment0 del Vulore degli Immobili).  In contrast with ILOR, a 
local tax only in name, INVIM is truly a local tax, providing about 15 percent 
of municipal tax revenues. 
The tax base of INVIM is the difference between the current price and the 
price recorded at the time of  the previous ownership transfer. Until recently 
this value was assessed by  the tax authorities. However, since this method of 
assessment often led to lengthy disputes that had to be settled by  special tax 
courts, in July 1986 a new rule was introduced: the price declared by the parties 
cannot questioned by  tax authorities if  it equals or exceeds the value that is 
imputed to real estate of that class. This imputed value equals the correspond- 
ing statutory rent, or renditu catastale, multiplied by  100 (if the initial value 
refers to the period before 1963, the renditu catastale is multiplied by 35). 
As shown in the top panel of table 5.7, the tax is progressive: rates vary from 
5 to 30 percent, and the tax base depends on the initial value of the property 
and the number of years that it was held. Suppose that a house bought for 10 
million lire in 1980 is resold in 1990 for 220 million lire. The total tax base is 
the price increment of 210 million lire. In the second panel of table 5.7 we 
compute the tax liability (units are million lire). The figures in the second col- 
umn sum to 210 million lire, i.e., to the price increment. The overall tax liabil- 
ity-the  sum of the figures in the third column-is  36 million lire, correspond- 
ing to an average tax rate of 17.1 percent and a marginal tax rate of 30 percent. 
The average and marginal tax rates are so high because in this example the 
price increase is very high (2,200 percent) and the holding period is relatively 
short (10 years). In fact the tax is structured so that the marginal tax rate is an 
increasing function of the property's price increment and a decreasing function 
of the holding period. The bottom panel of table 5.7 shows that the marginal 
tax rate can be as low as 5 percent for a house with a relatively small price 
increase and a relatively long holding period, and as high as 30 percent for 
large price increases and short holding periods. For instance, if the price in- 
crease is 100 percent and the holding period is longer than 5 years, the mar- 
ginal tax rate is 5 percent, but the same price increment is subject to a marginal 
tax rate of  15 percent if the house is held for only one year. 
Inheritances and gifts are the only other cases in which taxes are levied on 
wealth, rather than on income. In contrast to all other OECD countries, which 
have  either an estate tax-where  the tax base and  tax  rate depend on  the 
amount transferred by  the decedent-or  an inheritance tax-where  the tax 
base and tax rate depend on the amount received by the beneficiary-Italy  has 
both, inheritance taxes being levied only on legacies outside the immediate 116  Tullio Jappelli and Marco Pagano 
Table 5.7  INVIM 








Portion of the Price Increment Taxed 
20% of  the initial value X number of years asset was held 
30% of the initial value X number of years asset was held 
50% of the initial value X number of years asset was held 
50% of  the initial value X number of  years asset was held 
50% of  the initial value X number of years asset was held 
any residual part of the price increment 
An Example of  INVIM" 
% X  Initial Value  Tax Liability 







20% x 10 x 10 = 20 
30% X  10 X  10 = 30 
50% X  10 X 10 = 50 
50% X  10 X  10 = 50 
50% X 10 X  10 = 50 
the residual 10 million lire 
5% X  20 = 1 
10% x 20 = 2 
15% X 50 = 7.5 
20% X 50 = 10 
25%  X 50 = 12.5 
30% X  10 = 3 
Marginal Tax Rates of INVIM 
% Increase in the Price of Real Estate 
Holding Period 








0.05  0.10  0.15  0.25  0.30  0.30 
0.05  0.10  0.10  0.15  0.25  0.30 
0.05  0.05  0.05  0.10  0.15  0.15 
0.05  0.05  0.05  0.10  0.10  0.15 
0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.10  0.10 
0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.10  0.10 
0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.10 
'In  this example, the property is assumed to be worth  10 million lire in 1980 and sold for 220 
million lire in 1990. 
family. These taxes were first introduced in 1972, replacing earlier legislation. 
Tax brackets and tax rates for both types of taxes have been changed frequently 
in the past 20 years, but the general principles on which their provisions are 
based have remained the same. 
Table 5.8 describes the current system of inheritance and estate taxes. Gifts 
are taxed in a similar way. The general principle is that of progressive taxation; 
as with IRPEF, the top marginal tax rates were considerably reduced in the 
seventies and eighties. Spouses and direct descendants are subject only to the 
estate tax. Relatives and other recipients are also subject to the inheritance tax, 
with tax rates that vary among classes of beneficiaries. Life insurance policies, 
social security benefits, and public debt are tax-exempt. 117  Government Incentives and Household Saving in Italy 
Table 5.8  Marginal Tax Rates on Estates, Inheritances, and Gifts: 1992 
Marginal Inheritance Tax (in addition 
to estate taxes; %) 
Tax Bracket  Marginal Estate 
(million lire)  Tax (%) 
Brothers, Sisters,  Other  Other 










































Note:  The spouse and direct descendants of  the transferor are exempt from inheritance tax. In 
January 1992, the threshold for estate tax was 250 million lire. The threshold for inheritance tax 
varies and is graduated on the three classes of  beneficiaries: 100 million lire for brothers, sisters, 
nephews, and nieces, 10 million lire for other relatives and for other beneficiaries. The tax regime 
for gifts is the same as that for bequests. 
As was shown in table 5.5, inheritance, estate, and gift taxes have always 
been a minor source of government revenue (0.2 percent of total tax revenues). 
In particular, the revenue from gift taxes is extremely low (0.01 percent of total 
revenues), reflecting in part the difficulty of aggregating gift taxes and estate 
taxes (OECD 19SS), and in part the ease with which taxes on gifts are evaded. 
5.2.4  Capital Gains on Equities 
Until 1990, as a practical matter, capital gains on equities were tax-exempt, 
although in principle they were subject to general income tax if  the relevant 
transactions were undertaken with “speculative intent.” However, as the defi- 
nition of speculative intent was not objective and the burden of proof lay with 
the tax revenue service, no tax  on capital gains on equities was effectively 
le~ied.~ 
After a rather confused transition between September 1990 and March 199  1, 
a system was introduced according to which investors can choose one of two 
tax regimes. Under one regime, capital gains are taxed at a flat 25 percent, 
and losses can be deducted from taxable income for the subsequent five years. 
Alternatively, investors can pay a proportion of the resale value of their shares, 
irrespective of the realized capital gain; this proportion is set each quarter by 
5. There were exceptional cases, however, where speculative intent was presumed by  the tax 
code. The exceptions were the sale of  shares held for less than five years in the following cases: 
until 1984, the sale of unlisted shares of real estate companies; between 1984 and 1990, the sale 
of  more than 2 percent of  the value of  listed companies, more than  10 percent (5 percent after 
1987) of unlisted  companies, and more than 25 percent  (15 percent after  1987) of  unincorpo- 
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the Board of  the Stock Exchange Brokers, and in no case can it be less than 
0.3 percent or higher than 1.05 percent. The second regime can be chosen only 
for transactions involving relatively small volumes of shares: less than 2 per- 
cent of the share value of  listed companies (less than 5 percent of the equity 
value of unlisted companies and less than 15 percent of unincorporated compa- 
nies). Each year taxpayers must opt for one of the two rules and may not alter 
their choices for the whole year. 
If  shares are held by  an investment fund, the tax regime is totally different: 
the income distributed to unit holders is tax-exempt, but the net worth of the 
investment fund is subject to a tax of 0.25 percent. 
5.2.5  Tax Treatment of Household Liabilities 
As was shown in table 5.2, one of the striking facts about the Italian econ- 
omy is the extraordinarily low level of household borrowing. There are a num- 
ber of reasons for this. The regulation of the banking industry and the costs of 
judicial enforcement of loan contracts have limited the availability of credit to 
households (Guiso et al. 1994; Jappelli and Pagano 1994). Another reason for 
the limited stock of  household debt is the lack of  substantial tax incentives, 
either for personal credit or home mortgage credit. 
In some countries, such as Sweden and the United States until the tax reform 
of  1986, interest payments on consumer credit are tax-deductible. No such 
privileged treatment for consumer credit and personal loans is given to Italian 
households. In 1980-85 the ratio of consumer credit to personal consumption 
expenditures in Sweden was on average 17 times higher than in Italy, and in 
the United States it was 10 times higher (Jappelli and Pagano 1989). It is hard 
not to relate these huge differences in the personal credit market, at least partly, 
to the disparate tax treatment. 
The other area in which households often benefit from tax deductions is 
mortgage loans for home purchase. In Italy, however, direct government inter- 
vention in housing finance is limited, and tax incentives have been reduced 
over time. Until  1976 all interest payments were tax-deductible; in  1976 a 
yearly ceiling of  3 million lire was  set (raised to 4 million in  1980). But the 
deductibility of interest payments was abolished in 1990, for all but first-home 
buyers. In most European countries, and in the United States, deductions are 
more generous (EC Mortgage Federation 1990). 
Other incentives to housing finance had been provided by a law enacted in 
1984 and abrogated in January of  1991, offering loans at subsidized interest 
rates: the rate was inversely related to household income and ranged from 5.5 
to 13 percent. The law  set stringent eligibility requirements: the head of the 
household had to be under 45 years old, employed continuously for at least 
two years, and not already a homeowner. The maturity of the subsidized loan 
was 20 years, and the loan could finance up to 75 percent of the value of the 
house. However, the mortgage could not exceed 60 million lire, about twice 
the average household income, and the house could not be resold before the 
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5.2.6  Summary 
The overall picture of  the taxation of  capital income is one of  relatively 
favorable treatment of  interest income, compared to labor income and divi- 
dends, and of  strict provisions on the deductibility of interest on household 
liabilities. Compared with the tax regime of the early seventies, tax rates on 
most forms of capital income have been raised considerably, while the deduct- 
ibility of  mortgage interest has been restricted. Government bonds, exempt 
until  1986, are now taxed; the tax rates on deposits have doubled, and since 
1990 capital gains have been taxed more severely. The only assets for which 
the tax burden has eased are some private bonds and foreign assets, which 
traditionally have been a small share of households’ portfolios, as was shown 
in table 5.2. Moreover, as was shown in figure 5.1, rates on government bonds 
and private bonds have converged to 12.5 percent and those on foreign assets 
and bank deposits to 30 percent, indicating an effort to reduce the substantial 
tax distortions that affected the portfolio choices of  Italian households in the 
seventies. 
5.3  Pension Plans and Retirement Saving 
Social security provisions, pension arrangements, and the rules determining 
severance pay (indennita diJine rapporto) are generally held to be key determi- 
nants of the national saving rate? However, very few studies have investigated 
how Italian national saving has responded to changes in the social security 
system, and none has analyzed the impact on saving of  the tax treatment of 
private pensions and of the rules concerning severance pay. 
As shown in table 5.9, social security benefits represent a large share (55 
percent) of the income of households with retired heads. On average, an addi- 
tional 25 percent of income is provided by labor earnings, and 10 percent by 
imputed income from housing. Interest income accounts for only 10 percent 
of the income of retirees, in the form of either financial wealth (4.0 percent) or 
other capital income (5.5 percent). These figures already show that voluntary 
accumulation schemes such as pension funds represent a fairly small source of 
income for the elderly. As will be seen below, the main reasons are that in Italy 
social security provides relatively generous benefits and that severance pay has 
a far more important role than in other industrialized countries. 
5.3.1  Social Security 
Until 1952 the Italian social security system was fully funded. Starting in 
that year, the government set minimum pensions, gradually extended compul- 
6. Replacing a funded  social security  system with a pay-as-you-go system reduces national 
saving (Feldstein 1974) unless people fully discount the implied burden of future social security 
contributions (Barro 1974). Public policy also affects national saving through tax incentives to 
private pension funds and to deferred workers’ compensation (severance pay). These incentives 
increase the present discounted value of retirement income; whether they induce young people to Table 5.9  Income Sources of Households with Retired Head (thousand 1987 lire) 
% of  Social  Labor  Income from  Other Income  Imputed Income 































































































































Source: Cannari and Franco (1990, table 7). 
Note; The numbers in parentheses are percentages of total income in each age group 121  Government Incentives and Household Saving in Italy 
sory contributions to farmers and the self-employed, and supplemented the 
system with unfunded social security benefits. However, one key principle of 
funded systems was retained: pension benefits were still proportional to contri- 
butions. Thus, between  1952 and 1968, the social security system was partly 
unfunded. 
The link between contributions and benefits was severed in 1969, with three 
major innovations. First, benefits were made proportional to the number of 
years of contributions and to average earnings over the three years preceding 
retirement. Second, the system became entirely pay-as-you-go: anyone more 
than 65 years old was entitled to a “social pension,” irrespective of contribu- 
tions during working life. Third, the maximum pension rose to 80 percent of 
the last salary, and benefits were indexed to the cost of living. 
The seventies witnessed a series of reforms relaxing the eligibility criteria. 
This led to rapid growth in social security benefits, from 7.5 percent of GDP 
in 1970 to 10.2 percent in 1980 and 13.9 percent in 1990. In 1975 the index- 
ation system was changed: minimum pensions were indexed to the earnings of 
employed workers, leading to automatic increases in the real value of benefits. 
As the increase in contributions did not keep pace, the result was a growing 
social security deficit (Rossi and Visco 1994). 
Currently, the eligibility requirements for pension benefits are: making con- 
tributions for 35 years or making contributions for a minimum of 15 years and 
being over age 55 for women and age 60 for men. For all private sector employ- 
ees, yearly benefits are determined by 0.02nS, where y1 is the number of years 
of contributions (maximum 40) S is average yearly salary over the 5 years be- 
fore retirement, adjusted for the increase in the cost of living, and 0.02 repre- 
sents the yearly accrual rate.7 In  1988, there was a maximum pension of 33.5 
million lire after 40 years of contributions, corresponding to a yearly salary of 
41.9 million lire. In  1989 the maximum pension was increased by  1.5 percent 
for earnings between 41.9 and 55.6 million lire, 1.25 percent between 55.7 and 
69.5 million, and 1 percent above 64.5 million lire. In 1990 the social pension, 
or old-age benefit to poor people over 50 years of  age without contributions, 
was 6 million lire. 
The degree of  indexation of retirement benefits is inversely related to their 
amount. Pensions up to twice the minimum are fully indexed to the cost of 
living. Indexation falls to 90 percent for pensions between 2 and 3 times the 
minimum, and to 75 percent for pensions over 3 times the minimum. Social 
security contributions equal 25.15 percent of gross salary, 7.15 percent being 
contributed by the employee and 18 percent by the employer. Benefits are taxed 
at the general progressive income tax rate. 
save less or more for retirement is not clear, because this depends on the relative strength of income 
and substitution effects. 
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This brief account highlights the particularly high benefits and broad eligi- 
bility criteria of the Italian social security system. In most other OECD coun- 
tries, social security benefits are lower, either because they are unrelated to 
earnings history, or because only a fraction of  the benefits is so related, as 
in the United Kingdom. And where benefits are proportional to past salaries, 
eligibility requirements and pension award formulas are less generous than in 
Italy: (i) minimum retirement age is higher, (ii) pension benefits are not com- 
puted on the basis of the last five years’ earnings but on the basis of the last 10 
(France) or the entire career (Germany and Belgium), (iii) the accrual rate 
ranges from 1.33 percent in Belgium to 1.9 percent in Austria, compared to 2 
percent in Italy, (iv) the maximum pension as a fraction of  salary is lower 
everywhere, except Germany, (v) benefits are indexed to the prices, rather than 
to salaries as in Italy, and (vi) the rules concerning double pensions and bene- 
fits paid to survivors are stricter than in Italy. 
As a result of these differences, in 1985 the ratio of social security benefits 
to the yearly salary of men with 40 years of contributions was 80 percent in 
Italy, compared to 60 percent in Germany, 55 percent in Belgium, 50 percent 
in France, and 25 percent in the United Kingdom (CREL 1990,62). 
The increasing generosity of Italian eligibility rules and award formulas is 
indicated by the rise in the ratio of the average retirement pension to the aver- 
age salary from 26 percent in 1960 to 44 percent in 1987. According to macro- 
economic evidence reported by  Rossi and Visco (1994), the increased benefits 
paid by the social security system have been perceived by  Italian households 
as an increase in social security wealth and have been a key determinant of the 
reduction in the private saving rate. 
However, this very increase in benefits and the rapid aging of  the Italian 
population may  foster the perception that the current system cannot be  SUS- 
tained indefinitely. If  so, perceived social security wealth is lower than the 
present discounted value of the net benefits implied by the rules of the current 
regime (Castellino 1986). Evidence of this is provided by Brugiavini (l987), 
who computes a measure of  social security wealth using the 1984 Survey of 
Household Income and Wealth and finds that pension wealth is only a very 
imperfect substitute for private net worth. She suggests that increased pension 
benefit coverage may have had only a small impact on saving because people 
anticipate an increase in future contributions or a decrease in pension benefits. 
In fact, the unsustainability of  current social security arrangements  is recog- 
nized by a number of studies. Franco et al. (1994) apply the method of genera- 
tional accounting  proposed by Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff (199  l)  to the 
Italian case. This method measures how  much present generations are ex- 
pected to pay  on net to the government over their remaining lifetimes. The 
social security system is found to be a critical factor in the huge generational 
imbalance of Italian fiscal policy, an imbalance that is unsustainable under the 
current fiscal regime. The National Institute for Social Security (INPS 1991) 
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benefits to total income subject to pension contribution) will rise from 39.5 
percent in 1990 to 45 percent in 2010. Similarly, the State Accounting Office 
(Ragioneria Generale dell0 Stato 1991) estimates this rate at 48 percent in 
2010 and 57 percent in 2025. 
These alarming figures indicate the urgency of  reform: current proposals 
contemplate raising the retirement age by five years for both men and women, 
reducing benefits (especially maximum pensions), and increasing contribu- 
tions. 
5.3.2  Private Pension Funds 
In contrast with the universal coverage of the social security system, private 
pension funds in Italy have always been minuscule, despite extremely favor- 
able tax treatment. People are not allowed to join a pension fund as individuals. 
Participation in a private pension fund is possible only by explicit contractual 
arrangement between a group of  workers or a union and a firm or group of 
firms. All the major Italian pension funds are defined-contribution rather than 
defined-benefit plans. 
Guerra (1991) reports that in  1990 there were about 300 private pension 
funds, mainly serving employees of insurance companies and banks. In recent 
years pension funds have been set up also by some large corporations, such as 
IBM, ENI, Olivetti, Montedison, and FIAT. As was shown in table 5.3, the 
total outstanding value of  pension funds was 40 trillion lire in  1988, or 4.5 
percent of GDP. These funds serve about 400,000 workers, only 2 percent of 
the employed workers, by  far the smallest proportion in  any major OECD 
country (CREL 1990). 
Workers’ and employers’ contributions to private pensions are fully tax- 
deductible, regardless of amount. Taxes are levied when the pension is cashed, 
either as an annuity or as a lump sum payment. In the former case, only 60 
percent of the pension is considered part of the recipient’s taxable income for 
income tax purposes. In the latter case, the lump sum payment is subject to 
separate taxation, like severance pay (see below). Since 1988 the tax base has 
been the difference between the lump sum payment and the sum of the worker’s 
contributions, up to contributions of 4 percent of yearly earnings. 
Pension funds are allowed to set their own rules on investment policy, the 
age at which benefits are payable, and treatment of  withdrawal, death of the 
employee, layoff, and resignation. In most cases the portfolio of pension funds 
is formed by securities and real estate. Early withdrawal is generally possible, 
though sometimes is penalized. A study by Piatti (1990) indicates that Italian 
pension funds suffer from several limitations as savings instruments: (i) dispar- 
ities among statutory regulations, (ii) nontransparency of investment policies, 
partly due to their defined-contribution nature, (iii) variable tax treatment of 
their capital income, depending on their legal nature and on their investment 
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5.3.3  Severance Pay 
Severance pay  is a far larger component of  household lifetime income in 
Italy than in most other countries. The size of the fund that firms accumulate 
to face their severance pay  liabilities can be inferred from national account 
flow data on allocations and withdrawals. Castellino (1973) estimated the value 
of  this fund at the end of  1972 in  the range of  6.5 to 9.5 trillion lire, i.e., 
between 8.1 and 11.9 percent of GDP. As was shown in table 5.3, in  1988 it 
amounted to 115 trillion lire, 10.5 percent of GDP. 
Initially, severance pay was intended to insure the employee against the risk 
of  dismissal, but it gradually evolved into a form of deferred compensation, 
irrespective of  the cause of  termination of employment: the employee is en- 
titled to it whether he retires, is laid off, or quits. 
By law, the employer must pay a fraction of the wage bill into a fund, from 
which employees cannot draw until the termination of their employment (with 
exceptions noted below). Since 1982, severance pay has been computed as 7.4 
percent of gross yearly salary for each year worked.* Severance pay is indexed 
and increases each year by  0.015 + 0.75 IT,  where IT  is the rate of change of 
the consumer price index. This implies that the worker’s real return on the fund 
is negative for inflation rates above 6 percent, which has been the case in Italy 
since the law has been in force, except for 1986-88. Until 1982 the severance 
pay of each worker was effectively indexed to the rate of change of his nominal 
wage, so as to guarantee a positive real return. 
Severance pay is rather illiquid and can be regarded as an example of forced 
saving in favor of  firms. Workers can use part of their severance pay only for 
exceptional medical expenses or for the purchase of a first dwelling (i.e., the 
first house ever bought in the city of residence). Withdrawal is allowed only 
once during the employment contract, and only for a small fraction of  each 
company’s work force at any given time. 
Severance pay enjoys a double tax advantage. First, there is a deduction from 
the tax base, which is determined by  P -  nA, where P is severance pay, n is 
the number of years of employment, and A is a constant allowance (equal to 
500,000 lire in 1988). Second, the tax rate is substantially lower than the corre- 
sponding personal income tax rate would be: namely, it is the average tax rate 
corresponding to an income of  12Pln. For workers with sufficiently high se- 
niority, this is lower than their general income tax rate. 
5.4  Life Insurance 
Italian households hold very little wealth in the form of life insurance poli- 
cies: until 1985 life insurance premiums hovered around 0.3 percent of GDP, 
a proportion which doubled in the late eighties, following a partial deregulation 
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of the insurance market and the introduction of tax incentives. Nevertheless, at 
the end of  1987, Italy ranked twenty-third in  the market for life insurance 
among OECD countries. Of  the two forms of  contracts-annuities  and life 
insurance-the  former is virtually nonexistent. 
The number of pure annuity contracts ranged between 6,000 and 10,000 in 
the eighties (0.1 percent of the population over age 65), one-twentieth of  the 
figure in the United States, where  2 percent of  the elderly hold annuities 
(Friedman and Warshawsky 1990). Fornero (1986) suggests that the rarity of 
pure annuities is explained by  the absence of  tax incentives. Life insurance 
contracts are more popular. In 1988 they numbered 800,000. The correspond- 
ing reserves of  the insurance companies were 24.7 trillion lire in  1988, 1.7 
percent of GDP (see table 5.3). 
Despite the partial liberalization of  1986, regulation in the life insurance 
industry remains pervasive. Guiso et al. (1994) report that three main factors 
still severely limit competition. First, new entrants must be  licensed by  the 
Ministry of  Industry. Until  1986 authorization was on a totally discretionary 
basis, and in practice no new life insurance company was licensed between 
World War  I1 and  1985. In  1986 licensing was made nondiscretionary: it is 
sufficient for applicants to satisfy a number of  requisites, such as specified 
financial ratios. 
Second, life insurance companies are required to turn over to INA, a public 
company, 30 percent of their premium income for the first five years, 20 per- 
cent for the following five years, and 10 percent thereafter,9  obviously a power- 
ful deterrent to potential entrants. 
Third, minimum premiums for life insurance are set each year by the Minis- 
try of Industry. The actual premiums are the sum of three components: a fair 
premium, a spread to compensate the insurance company, and a commission 
to agents. The first two are set by  the central authority and the third by  the 
insurance agents themselves. If a company sold insurance at a price below that 
set by  the regulating agency, its license could be revoked. In 1990 the excess 
of  actual premiums over fair premiums for standard life insurance policies 
ranged from 18 to 20 percent. 
The returns on life insurance contracts were consistently negative until the 
mid-eighties. Contracts provided  no protection at all against inflation until 
1973. Starting in 1974 the yield on life insurance was adjusted at a fixed rate 
(3.5-4 percent). With inflation at 20 percent, returns were abysmally negative 
throughout the seventies and early eighties. From 1974 to 1983 very few indi- 
viduals signed new life insurance contracts, and those bound by old ones suf- 
fered great losses: in the early eighties the life insurance market was near col- 
lapse. The response of  insurance companies was to offer indexed contracts, 
9. Before 1985, the rule was even more severe. Insurers were required to turn over to INA 40 
percent of their premiums for the first 10 years of operation, 30 percent for the following 10 years, 
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with yields partially indexed to nominal interest rates: 80 percent of the pre- 
mium has the same return as the portfolio of  the insurance company. After 
1984, the real rate of return on life insurance contracts became positive, com- 
parable to that on Italian public debt. 
Since 1986 the tax code has allowed a deduction from the policyholder's 
general income tax base of premium payments (P)  up to 2.5 million lire per 
year. To be eligible for this deduction, the insurance contract must last a mini- 
mum of five years and the individual must not borrow for the first five years of 
the contract. Insurance premiums are taxed at the time they are paid at the flat 
rate of 2.5 percent, and a proportional commission is charged on the premium. 
As a result, the net amount invested each year equals P/(  1 +  f),  where f is 
the sum of the tax rate on premiums and the commission rate charged by the 
insurance company. 
If the taxpayer takes the option of being paid a lump sum at the expiration 
of the policy rather than an annuity, he pays taxes at the rate of 12.5 percent on 
the difference between this payment and the sum of premiums paid.'O  If  one 
instead opts for an annuity, 60 percent of it is considered taxable income. In 
case of  early withdrawal, the individual is entitled to the reimbursement of 
nominal contributions. 
Because of the different tax treatment between annuities and lump sum pay- 
ments, almost invariably life insurance contracts terminate with  the client 
choosing to collect the capital, rather than convert it into a stream of  yearly 
income payments. Thus the lump sum option is the only one we  consider 
below. 
In order to compare the return on tax-favored life insurance contracts with 
that provided by an alternative financial asset, we compute the return of a typi- 
cal life insurance policy with the following features: (i) the premium is a con- 
stant nominal amount  P, equal to (or less than) 2.5 million lire so that it is fully 
tax-deductible from IRPEF,  and is paid for a number of years  T 2  5, and 
(ii) the net amount invested per year, P/( 1 +  f),  is rewarded at a rate that equals 
the after-tax rate of interest r paid by an alternative financial asset of the same 
maturity (e.g.,  government bonds). 
Denoting by T, the tax rate on the difference between the lump sum payment 
and the cumulated premiums TP, and by  T,, the marginal personal income tax 
rate, the value of the policy in year T is given by: 
[  (I + r)T -  11 -  Tp} 
~-  P  l+r  [(I + r)T-  11 -  Tc{Ff---  P  l+r 
l+f  r  r 
10. The current tax treatment of insurance contracts is in some respects more favorable in the 
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The expression above is the sum of three terms: the value of the lump sum 
collected in year 7: the tax liability on the difference between the lump sum 
and the sum of  premiums TP, and the tax saving due to the deductibility of 
premiums. Given that the present value of the cash invested in the policy is: 
the “excess return” of the policy over the interest rate r is: 
future value of the policy 
-  (I + r) 
Fesent value of cash invested  (3)  ( 
Figure 5.2 shows the excess return of the policy under the assumption that 
the annual premium equals 2.5 million lire, that the insurance’s commission is 
7.75 percent of the premium-so  thatf = 10.25 percent-and  that the after- 
tax rate of interest is 10.57 percent.” The excess return varies according to the 
taxpayer’s  marginal personal income tax rate and the duration of  the policy. 
The figure shows that the excess return of the policy over the market interest 
rate is higher, the higher the marginal income tax rate and the shorter the dura- 
tion of the policy. For very low income individuals the return is negative, be- 
cause the commission and the tax on premiums actually outweigh the tax in- 
centive. For a taxpayer whose marginal income tax rate is 33 percent, the 
standard five-year policy produces an excess return of 4.4 percent, while for 
individuals in the highest tax bracket the return above the market rate can be 
as high as 7.4 percent. 
5.5  Conclusions 
The Italian saving rate is high by  international standards. This is often attrib- 
uted to Italy’s relatively high productivity growth and relatively severe liquidity 
constraints. A second feature of national saving in Italy is its variability. After 
increasing sharply in the fifties and sixties, the Italian national and private sav- 
ing rates have declined markedly for two decades. Most explanations of this 
decline have focused on the slowdown in population and productivity growth 
after 1975, the role of  increased government debt and of public transfers to 
households, and the transition from a funded to a pay-as-you-go social secu- 
rity system. 
and capital are tax-exempt-capital  only if the contract exceeds a minimum duration (10 years in 
the United Kingdom, 12 in Germany, and 6 in France). 
11. The 7.75 percent  value is the “typical” commission,  while the  10.25 interest rate is that 
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Fig. 5.2 
bonds, plotted by income tax rates and duration of insurance policy (T) 
Excess return on life insurance policies over return on government 
So far, no study has investigated whether changes in the tax code have con- 
tributed to changes in the household saving rate. Our analytical description of 
the Italian tax system suggests that the relatively high level of Italian saving 
may  also be due to the favorable tax treatment of  capital income and to the 
lack of incentives to borrow. 
However, changes in the Italian tax code are unlikely to offer a satisfactory 
explanation for the decline in the Italian saving rate, since the tax reforms of 
the past two decades have been piecemeal and contradictory in this respect: 
the tax burden on capital income has increased, but new incentives for life 
insurance were enacted in the mid-eighties, and the deductibility of  interest 
payments on mortgage loans was considerably restricted. One would expect 
these changes to  have opposite effects on saving, and without more detailed 
empirical analysis one cannot assess their net impact. What does emerge, how- 
ever, is that the new  tax incentives have not prompted any substantial shift 
toward the favored assets. Few Italians have taken out life insurance policies, 
and very few have joined private pension funds. This is indirect evidence that 
the introduction of the new incentives has had a correspondingly minor impact 
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It is easier to assess the impact of the dramatic changes in the Italian social 
security system, which has rapidly evolved from the funded to the pay-as-you- 
go model. Unless one subscribes to the dynastic view of  Barro (1974), one 
would expect this to have contributed to the decline in the national saving rate 
in the seventies and eighties. Whether the generous social security benefits will 
continue to lower saving in the future is an open question, depending in part 
on the perceived sustainability of the current system and on expectations about 
the proposed reform plans. 
Appendix 
Summary of Taxes on Capital Income and Wealth and 
of  Saving Incentives 
1.  Taxation of Capital Income 
Dividends andprojits: top marginal tax rate 72 (1975-82), 65 (1983-85), 
Interest income: flat rate 
Bank and postal deposits: 15 (1970-75),  16 (1976), 18 (1978), 20 (1978- 
Postal savings: exempt until September 1986, 6.25 (1986), 12.5 percent 
Certificates of deposit: 
Less than 18 months: as bank deposits until 1988, 25 percent afterwards. 
More  than  18 months:  10 (1970-82),  10.8 (1982-83),  12.5  percent 
Government bills and bonds and bonds issued by government agencies: 
exempt until September 1986, 6.25 (1986), 12.5 percent (since 1987). 
Private bonds issued by: 
Special Credit Institutions: 10 (1970-82),  10.8 (1982-83),  12.5 percent 
ENI, IRI, and financial enterprises: 20 (1974-82),  10.8 (1982-83),  12.5 
Nonfinancial enterprises: 30 (1974-73,  20 (1976-82),  10.8 (1982-83), 
Convertible bonds:  15 (1974-75),  10 (1976-82),  10.8 (1982-83),  12.5 
Foreign assets: 30 (1970-72),  53 (1973-83),  50 (1984), 44 (1985), 39 
Investment funds: income is tax-exempt; capital tax  rate 0.25 percent 
62 (1986-88), 50 percent (since 1989). 




percent (since 1984). 
12.5 percent (since 1984). 
percent (since 1984). 
(1986), 30 percent (since 1987). 







Full deductibility of interest payments until 1976; from 1976, interest pay- 
ments deductible up to 3 million lire (4  million after 1980); except for 
first-home buyers, deductibility was abolished in 1990. 
Consumer credit 
No tax deductibility of interest payments. 
Taxation of wealth and capital gains 
Net wealth tax: no wealth tax exists. 
Taxes at death and on gifts: both estate and inheritance tax exist (see text). 
Capital gains: virtually tax-exempt until 1990. From 1990 choice of two 
regimes: flat rate of 25 percent or flat rate on the value of the shares 
between 0.3 and 1.05 percent. 
Pension and Life Insurance Provisions 
Social security 
Employer pension contributions: no tax on contributions, taxed when paid 
as income. 
Private pension finds 
Employer pension contributions: no tax on contributions. 
Benefits: if paid as annuity, 60 percent is taxed at the general income tax 
rate; if paid as lump sum, difference between capital and contributions 
is taxed at 12.5 percent (if contributions are less than 4  percent of yearly 
gross wage). 
Severance pay 
Deduction from the tax base and tax rate below the corresponding income 




Tax deductible contribution: 2.5  million lire/year. 
Benefits: if paid as annuity 60 percent is taxed at the general income tax 
rate; if  paid as lump sum, difference between capital and the sum of 
premiums is taxed at 12.5 percent. 
Withdrawal provisions: if  withdrawn before 5 years, reimbursement of 
nominal premiums only. 
Sources: Alworth and Castellucci (1993); Giraldi, Hamaui and Rossi (1991); 
OECD (1988); see text. 131  Government Incentives and Household Saving in Italy 
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